Theoretical models of predator-prey system predict that sufficient enrichment of 2 prey can generate large amplitude limit cycles, paradoxically causing a high risk of 3 extinction (the paradox of enrichment). While real ecological communities contain 4 many gregarious species whose foraging behaviour should be influenced by socially 5 transmitted information, few theoretical studies have examined the possibility that 6 social foraging might be a resolution of the paradox. I considered a predator pop-7 ulation in which individuals play the producer-scrounger foraging game both in 8 a one-prey-one-predator system and a two-prey-one-predator system. I analysed 9 the stability of a coexisting equilibrium point in the former one-prey system and 10 that of non-equilibrium dynamics of the latter two-prey system. The result showed 11 that social foraging can stabilise both systems and thereby resolves the paradox of 12 enrichment when scrounging behaviour is prevalent in predators. This suggests a 13 previously neglected mechanism underlying a powerful effect of group-living animals 14 on sustainability of ecological communities.
Introduction
intrinsic growth rate, and K is the carrying capacity which traditionally indicates the 119 degree of enrichment [2, 30, 31] . intersects with the right-hand side of the humped prey isocline (dX/dt = 0), while it Figure 1A and 1B show both predator and prey isoclines of the model (Eq. 1). When 138 the finder's advantage is sufficiently small (i.e, f /F ≤ dh/b), the predator isocline is 139 concave-down and never intersects with the left side of the humped prey isocline ( Figure   140 1A, Appendix A), and thereby the predator and prey can stably coexist regardless of 141 prey enrichment. Figure 1A also shows that the equilibrium densities of both species 142 increase with enrichment when f /F ≤ dh/b. Therefore, the paradox of enrichment 143 disappears if scrounging behaviour is prominent in the predator population.
Result

144
On the other hand, when the finder's advantage is large (i.e, f /F > dh/b), the 145 predator isocline is concave-up and the intersect eventually move to the left side of the 146 hump as K increases, and hence the paradox still exists ( Figure 1B) . 3 Two prey -one predator system This two-prey-one-predator system, which consists of more-profitable prey X 1 , less-158 profitable prey X 2 , and predator Y , is described as follows:
.
Producer-scrounger game under multiple prey types
Because there are two different prey populations, I had to consider the PS game under 188 multiple food types. As in the one-prey-one-predator model described above, I suppose 189 that the predator population (Y ) is divided into g groups of G individuals each (Y = gG), 190 and the predator individuals can choose either producing or scrounging. 
where q (0 ≤ q ≤ 1) is the proportion of producers.
200
Setting I p = I s obtains a behaviourally (or evolutionally) stable strategy [23] of 201 producing probability q * (Appendix B):
Note that when F = F 1 = F 2 and f = f 1 = f 2 , the equilibrium is consistent with the 203 original PS game equilibrium q * = g/Y + f /F [18] . Following the one-prey-one-predator 204 model, I further assume that behavioural plasticity allows predator individuals to adjust 205 to the behavioural ESS within the single time step of the population dynamics, so that 206 they always achieve q = q * at the timescale of the population dynamics. Next, I considered the differences between the finder's advantage of two prey species.
225
I examined the magnitude of oscillation against possible combinations of f 1 /F 1 and 226 f 2 /F 2 , for different profitability of the less-profitable prey ε 2 /h 2 . Figure 3 shows that 227 the system is stable under a broad range of combinations of the finder's advantages.
228
When ε 2 /h 2 is small ( Figure 3A and 3B) , the stability of the system relies only on the 229 finder's advantage for the more-profitable prey f 1 /F 1 . This is because the less-profitable 230 prey is hardly ever included in the diet because of the low profitability, and thereby 231 f 2 /F 2 never affects the predators' behaviour. On the other hand, when the profitability 232 of the less-profitable prey is large enough to actually be included in the predator's diet, 233 both f 1 /F 1 and f 2 /F 2 affect the stability (Figure 3C and 3D) . exists unless r is sufficiently large as follows:
These results was obtained by using Mathematica software. The code is available 344 from the author. 
Hence q * is stable since (F i − f i ) > 0. 
